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Abstract: 
Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. 
In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from 
experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths 
and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite 
views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on 
the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, 
react to the same desert-based considerations as do ascriptions of moral responsibility. In response, 
Stephen Morse has argued that the law should indeed be reformed so as to excuse those with 
severe psychopathy from blame, but that psychopaths who have committed criminal offences 
should still be subject to some legal repercussions such as civil commitment. We argue that 
consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations analogous to those that support punishing 
psychopaths, or at least retaining some legal liability, might also be drawn on in favour of holding 
psychopaths morally accountable. 
 
Introduction 
Psychopaths are frequently introduced in the literature by citing their typical character 
traits, i.e., grandiose, arrogant, callous, superficial and manipulative (Hare 1999). Much 
as we often disapprove of such traits, there are more serious systematic challenges to 
our moral and legal community posed by psychopaths. Although psychopaths represent 
a small proportion of all criminal offenders, they commit a disproportionate number of 
crimes compared to other psychiatric groups (Coid et al. 2009). Psychopaths are also 
over-represented in the criminal statistics listing the most appalling offences, including 
predatory violence and serial killings (Hemphill et al. 1998; Hare 1999). But our moral 
and social engagements with psychopaths are not limited to such sensational settings. 
For example, research from the corporate world shows that psychopathy ratings are 
positively associated with others’ perceptions of charm and charisma (Babiak and Hare 
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2007). The same individuals are known to also exploit their charm to further their own 
ends. In short, relationships with psychopaths pose problems in both criminal and non-
criminal contexts.  
 
It is clearly extremely difficult to remain neutral towards psychopaths; but the question 
is: how should we respond? Stephen Morse along with several other philosophers and 
legal experts has argued that evidence from psychology and neuroscience shows that 
psychopaths have considerable deficits in moral cognition and empathy and that 
therefore blaming psychopaths is either futile or unjustified as psychopaths are not 
(fully) morally responsible for their actions. In contrast, current legal practice holds that 
a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility and suggests that 
we are justified in punishing psychopaths for their crimes; psychopathic traits are in 
fact often regarded as an aggravating factor in sentencing (Lee 2007; Hart 2009).  
 
But having opposing views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one 
hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems problematic given the assumption 
that the law should, at least to some extent, react to similar considerations as our 
ascriptions of moral responsibility. Insofar as the criminal justice system is precisely a 
system of justice, it is natural to think that legal responsibility should largely rest on the 
same notion of “just desert”, as does moral responsibility. Indeed, Morse has argued that 
it is simply that legal practice lags behind and that the law should indeed be reformed 
so as to excuse at least those with severe psychopathy from blame and criminal 
responsibility. At the same time, he suggests that for consequentialist reasons we 
should consider subjecting psychopaths to some legal repercussions such as 
involuntary civil (or quasi-criminal) commitment (Morse 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b).  
 
 In this paper, we argue that insofar as we maintain consequentialist and norm-
expressivist considerations in support of punishing psychopaths, or at least retaining 
some legal liability, we should also apply analogous considerations in our moral 
practice. We proceed as follows. In section 2, we discuss desert-based arguments 
pertaining to the moral responsibility and blameworthiness of psychopaths. We argue 
that, as it currently stands, empirical evidence cited in arguments regarding 
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psychopaths’ moral responsibility is frequently inconclusive, although it is clear that 
psychopaths display significant impairments in their moral reasoning. In section 3, we 
outline consequentialist and Strawsonian considerations, according to which it is both 
pointless and inappropriate to hold psychopaths responsible. In section 4, we show that 
there is a persuasive line of argument from Morse and others that even if psychopaths 
are not fully morally responsible, they should at least still be subject to, if not 
punishment, some legal repercussions such as involuntary civil commitment, which can 
be justified on consequentialist grounds. We further argue that there are norm-
expressivist grounds for punishment, which arguably require a weaker notion of desert.  
 
In section 5, we argue that similar consequentialist and norm-expressivist 
considerations can be applied in the moral case. This line of argument concedes that, as 
pointed out in section 3, psychopaths may be incapable of moral responsiveness and 
moral changes of heart. Rather the argument is that holding psychopaths accountable 
may not be entirely pointless for the psychopath or for the moral community, as there is 
some evidence that, if we hold people with psychopathic traits accountable over time, 
they are capable of some, if not moral, at least behavioural and social improvement. 
Second, the norm-expressivist rationale from the legal case also holds true for non-
criminal context, namely that blame and condemnation functions as a means to 
reasserting and reinforcing the norms we care about. Finally, we will suggest that in 
moral practice we are often not in a position to judge whether an individual is 
psychopathic or not; thus it is better to err on the side of blaming rather than 
withholding judgment.  
 
2. Desert-based Arguments against the Moral Responsibility of Psychopaths 
 
Desert-based arguments for or against moral responsibility are normally concerned 
with the questions of whether an action was under the agent’s control and whether the 
agent understood the moral quality of his or her actions. While psychopaths exhibit 
psychological deficiencies in the area of self-control, empathy and in moral judgment 
(which correspond to distinctive neurological anomalies), the focus has generally been 
on moral judgment. We too will mainly focus on the question whether there is 
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something wrong with psychopaths’ moral understanding because, as Morse (2011a, 
928 f.) points out, the issue of control is extremely hard to assess and operationalize.2  
 
According to an influential argument against the moral responsibility of psychopaths, 
they lack moral knowledge and the requisite understanding of the moral character of 
their actions for full moral responsibility. (Cf. Fine and Kennett 2004; Levy 2007a, 
2007b, but also Litton 2008, who argues that psychopaths also suffer from more general 
deficits in rationality.) One form of this argument relies on findings by Blair, which show 
that psychopaths fail to distinguish between conventional and moral rules prohibiting 
certain actions in the moral/conventional task (Blair 1995, 1997). In these studies, 
psychopaths, as diagnosed by a high score on the psychopathy check-list scales (Hare 
1991), differed from non-psychopathic individuals in their assessment of the severity of 
moral vs. conventional transgressions, and the justifications they gave for something 
being wrong; they were far less likely to appeal to the harm done to another person 
when explaining why a moral transgression is wrong. Most strikingly, psychopaths 
differed in their assessment of the modifiability of rules. From a young age, non-
psychopathic individuals do not think that a suspension of a rule makes moral 
transgressions which harm others permissible, whereas they do take this to be the case 
with purely conventional rules.  
 
This latter aspect concerning the modifiability of rules has been the main focus of 
arguments regarding psychopaths’ moral understanding. In Blair’s 1995 study, 
psychopathic individuals did not change their assessments of permissibility in the way 
controls did. So, for example, when asked whether it was ok for children to talk in class 
if the teacher (authority) permitted it, they were far more likely to claim that talking in 
class still wasn’t ok. The data on the perceived modifiability of rules shows that 
psychopaths treat conventional rules much in the same way as controls treat moral 
rules, i.e. as authority-independent.  
 
                                                          
2 However, for an interesting argument that the capacity for self-regulation is a key part of moral agency 
and one on which psychopaths are likely fall short, see Kennett 2010. While we do touch on the issue of 
control in the context of psychopaths’ prudential deficits, we do not make it the focus of our discussion. 
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The inability to perceive a fundamental difference between moral and conventional 
transgressions has led Levy (2007a, 2007b) and others to assume that psychopaths 
have no genuine understanding of moral transgressions but rather understand moral 
transgressions as conventional ones. Levy takes behavioural findings demonstrating 
deficiencies in the recognition of emotions in others and neuroscientific evidence which 
shows that psychopaths exhibit amygdala dysfunction to explain why psychopaths lack 
moral understanding:  
 
[T]he psychopath’s amygdala dysfunction causes him or her … to have 
impaired representations of emotions. This leads to an impaired ability to 
recognize fearful and sad expressions in others; more crucially it interferes 
with the ability to categorize harms in terms of their effects on the 
emotional states of others. Hence the psychopath’s inability to categorize 
transgressions into moral and conventional categories. (Levy 2007a, p. 
249) 
 
However, this line of argument has been cast into doubt by recent empirical and 
philosophical work. On the empirical side, recent studies on psychopaths and the 
moral/conventional distinction have not reproduced Blair’s original results. Aharoni et 
al. (2012) tested psychopaths’ ability to distinguish between moral and conventional 
transgressions in a forced choice setting, telling the participants that half of the 
transgressions described were moral and the other half, conventional. They could not 
reproduce Blair’s results.3 Instead they found that the main factor in the ability to draw 
the moral/conventional distinction was IQ—although affective and antisocial 
characteristics were also correlated with reduced performance in the task. Psychopaths’ 
performance in the moral/conventional task is therefore not as clear-cut as Blair’s 
original studies suggested (however, see Levy (2014) for a response to these studies). 
 
Not only has the performance of psychopathic individuals in the moral/conventional 
                                                          
3 Dolan and Fullam (2010) also conducted a study with youths with conduct disorders where 
performance in the moral-conventional task only partially corresponded to what would be expected from 
Blair’s studies. 
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task come under attack, but also the validity of the distinction itself. In an online survey 
(Kelly et al. 2007) tested the hypothesis that judgments of moral impermissibility are in 
fact universal, authority-independent and sensitive to harm, by confronting participants 
with different examples from the ones used in the original moral/conventional task. 
They found that in a significant number of cases, participants’ judgments were sensitive 
to whether an authority had permitted the action in question even when another person 
was clearly harmed. These results do not provide a clear counter-example against the 
psychological validity of the moral/conventional distinction because there are 
complicating factors.4 However, the results do cast doubt on the notion that, in the 
minds of healthy individuals, there is a class of specifically moral transgressions, which 
are authority-independent, whose wrongness is independent of historical or 
geographical contexts, and which always involve harm, the violation of justice or rights 
(cf. Stich et al. 2009).  
 
Finally, Shoemaker (2011) provides an important philosophical critique of the 
distinction, arguing that the moral/conventional distinction subsumes a cluster of 
distinctions which only sometimes overlap. He suggests that both moral and 
conventional rules are authority-dependent, but in the case of moral infringement, the 
authority implicitly prohibiting the rule violation is the person who would be harmed 
by that violation. In one of the original examples, this would be the child whose hair is 
being pulled.  
 
It therefore seems that the moral/conventional distinction is unable to play the decisive 
role which it is often assigned in determining psychopaths’ moral desert. First, the jury 
is still out on whether psychopaths are, by and large, able to draw the morally relevant 
distinctions drawn by non-psychopaths, but simply fail to care about them, or whether 
they are indeed unable to understand what makes an immoral act wrong. Arguably, the 
jury is also still out on what exactly constitutes a moral/conventional distinction, and 
whether it is the unified distinction it is made out to be. At this point, any stance which 
                                                          
4 In some of the examples used, the harm occurs for some perceived future benefit and in others it is a 
reaction to a preceding transgression. This latter point is also made by Rosas (2012) in a criticism of Kelly 
et al.’s (2007) experimental setup. He also raises a further issue, which is that many of their examples are 
mixed domain situations where an authority’s rule differs from the moral rule. 
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crucially relies on the claim that psychopaths are incapable of understanding 
distinctions which healthy individuals readily understand is not sufficiently well 
supported by the empirical evidence. (Note that this is compatible with psychopaths’ 
deficits in representing and caring about the emotional states of others being crucial 
both for explaining their antisocial behaviour and disregard of the welfare of others.) At 
the same time, they do seem to have some awareness of the moral distinctions and 
justifications, which the majority of the population draw and the ability to cite these in 
explaining why a transgression is a moral one.  
 
Recently, Levy (2014) has also put forward a second argument against psychopaths’ 
moral responsibility. He argues that at least some psychopaths do not have a conception 
of what it is to be a person and due to this impairment they are unable to intend the 
specific type of harms that can only be done to persons. The argument draws on other 
authors’ work on the relation between the ability to project oneself into the past and the 
future and moral capacities and depends on empirical evidence, which point towards 
psychopaths having a specific problem with Mental Time Travel (MTT) (Among others, 
Levy cites McIlwain 2010). For Levy, the moral wrong of harming persons is 
inextricably linked to their personhood, since in harming them we interfere with their 
autonomy and their ability to shape their own lives. If psychopaths are incapable of 
understanding what personhood is, then any harm they do to others does not (from 
their perspective) have the character of being harm done to a person. In other words, 
they do not fully understand the moral character of their actions. Levy’s claim is that 
psychopaths do not have the capacity to understand what personhood is: “[A]n inability 
to engage in full blown MTT … also very probably entails impaired ability to grasp what 
it is to be a person, with plans and projects” (Levy 2014, p. 13).  
 
But this argument will only be successful if it can be shown that psychopaths genuinely 
lack a conception of certain harms, rather than just not caring about the harms done to 
others, for example because of their diminished capacity for empathy. In order to 
establish this, Levy needs to show that they have a similarly impaired understanding of 
harms done to themselves qua persons as they do when it comes to others. In so far as 
they resent harm done to them and have a concept of harm as applied to themselves, 
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they should be able to understand that this harm can befall others. In order to further 
support his argument, Levy would have to show that psychopaths’ perceptions of harms 
done to them and harms done to others are analogous. In other words, his thesis needs 
further empirical support. However, it is plausible that the argument applies to some 
extreme cases of psychopathy, characterized by strong impulsivity and disregard for the 
future repercussions of one’s actions for oneself (such as the cases described by Litton 
2008).  
 
To summarize, the empirical evidence shows that many psychopaths do exhibit 
abnormalities both in the area of moral cognition as well as that of moral emotions and 
motivation. However, the evidence is not strong enough to warrant the thought that 
psychopathy per se cancels out moral culpability and desert. For this to be the case, it 
would need to be shown that it is generally the case that psychopaths do not 
understand the moral quality of their actions and so far we do not believe this has been 
done. What does seem to be true is that individuals with psychopathy find it more 
difficult to master moral rules and care about them due to their impairments in emotion 
and cognition. Fine and Kennett (2004) and Kennett (2010) argue convincingly that a 
number of factors, including reduced fear, insensitivity to cognitive dissonance and 
reduced empathy jointly impair psychopaths’ moral development and competence. As 
psychopathy ranges over a continuum (Guay et al. 2007), it seems likely that there are 
cases where the deficits are so severe that they might cancel out moral desert.  
  
3. Blaming Psychopaths and the Argument from Moral Colour Blindness 
As we have seen in the above section, existing literature on moral responsibility has 
tended to focus on desert—on the question of whether blame is warranted. However, 
whether someone is morally responsible is also often answered with a view to the 
question: is there any point in blaming psychopaths? In what follows, we would like to 
argue that quite apart from what one concludes with respect to the question of desert or 
warrant, this second question is equally important. In other words, we want to propose 
that there is a legitimate issue about what holding psychopaths responsible or 
accountable achieves, irrespective of the question of whether blame is warranted on the 
ground of desert. 
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This question is arguably addressed by both consequentialist and also Strawsonian 
approaches to moral responsibility as they are concerned with whether an individual is 
a suitable addressee of certain reactive attitudes. From such perspectives, it has often 
been held that psychopaths are unsuitable candidates for blame or punishment because 
of their insensitivity to moral considerations. Blame, along with moral condemnation 
and holding individuals accountable more generally, are thus inappropriate reactions to 
the transgressions of psychopaths.  
 
While Morse’s reasons against holding psychopaths morally responsible are not 
consequentialist ones, his arguments are congenial to a consequentialist reading: 
 
If a person does not understand the point of morality and has no 
conscience or capacity for empathy, only fear of punishment will give that 
person a reason not to violate the rights of others … the psychopath is not a 
member of the moral community, is not someone with whom moral 
engagement is possible … psychopaths know the facts and the rules and are 
capable of manipulation of others to achieve their own ends, but they do 
not get the point of morality. It is as if they are morally colour blind. (Morse 
2008, p. 208-209)  
 
Morse here claims that, as psychopaths are insensitive to moral considerations which 
would typically move normal individuals, the inclusion of psychopaths in our moral 
community is impossible. They are not responsive to moral reasons—they are, as he 
puts it, “morally colour blind”. Notice that for this argument to hold it does not matter 
much whether this is because psychopaths do not see a distinction between different 
kinds of rules, e.g., moral or conventional, or because they do not care about a 
distinction that they are intellectually capable of drawing. People who are unresponsive 
to other people’s moral demands and needs will not consider others’ moral claims as 
something that provides them with reasons for action. The fact that the plight of others 
leaves them cold means that moral reasons do not motivate them. They will not feel the 
need to justify their actions morally and neither moral disapprobation nor indeed 
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approbation will have any impact on them. 
 
While Morse himself does not appear to take his argument against the moral 
responsibility of psychopaths to be primarily consequentialist, arguably once we start 
talking about “the point” of engaging with someone as a moral agent, concerns about 
present and future impact of blame and punishment become relevant. We agree with 
Morse that concerns regarding psychopaths’ lack of responsiveness or indifference to 
moral considerations should have a bearing on the nature and degree of our moral 
engagement with them. However, even if people with psychopathy are not fully 
responsive, there might nevertheless be further consequentialist reasons for retaining 
our moral demands on them. In the following sections, we will thus argue that there is 
on balance still “a point” in holding psychopaths accountable for their actions. To give a 
better appreciation of the type of considerations we might draw on, we will first turn to 
the criminal context and the legal discussion of non-desert-based concerns in the 
treatment of psychopaths. 
 
4. Psychopaths’ Legal Accountability 
Many lawyers, psychiatrists and philosophers think that the law should not mitigate 
legal or criminal responsibility on the basis of psychopathy and that psychopaths are 
punishable for their crimes (Pillsbury 1992; Reznek 1997; Hare 1999; Schopp and Slain 
2000; Litton 2008; Fox et al. 2013). Legal practice is in line with this opinion; indeed, it 
sometimes favours more severe punishment to psychopaths. For example, scoring high 
on the famous psychopathy checklist is often regarded an aggravating factor, resulting 
in harsher judicial sentencing (Lee 2007; Hart 2009; however, cf. Aspinwall et al. 2012). 
Psychopathy has even been used to justify imposition of the death penalty rather than a 
life sentence (Edens et al. 2001).  
 
Some of these legal opinions of course rest on the assumption that there are grounds for 
holding psychopaths morally responsible, such that they genuinely deserve their 
punishment. However, Morse is less convinced that such firm grounds for moral desert 
hold and therefore takes purely retributivist grounds for punishment to be 
inappropriate. As we have argued in section 2, we take the issue of desert to be 
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unresolved at this stage (although it is plausible that extreme cases of psychopathy do 
not fulfil the criteria for moral responsibility). But if there is any doubt regarding the 
moral responsibility of psychopaths, one arrives at the question of how one might 
justify their punishment or any other forms of legal accountability?5  
 
It is at this point that Morse and others suggest that various forward-looking 
considerations about psychopaths’ dangerousness and the norm-affirming role of legal 
institutions might be given some legitimate weight in the legal process. Such concerns 
can be raised in relation to different stages of the legal process as alternative 
justifications for legal accountability that are not, or at least not primarily, related to the 
issue of desert. Perhaps most commonly, they enter into the sentencing stage and in the 
assignment of punishment,6 e.g., as aggravating—or mitigating—factors. However, 
Morse (2010) suggests that even if one accepts that psychopaths should be excused, e.g., 
by means of a successful insanity defence,7 consequentialist considerations can enter as 
justifications for some other legal repercussions, e.g., civil or quasi-criminal 
commitment. For the purposes of this paper, we do not wish to take a position as to 
whether the concerns should be construed as, for example, supporting increased 
punishment, preventive detention or involuntary civil commitment. Our point here is 
rather to indicate that there are other reasons for holding psychopaths legally 
accountable as well as possibly punishing them that do not directly rest on desert-based 
justifications alone.  
 
Typically, the considerations for holding psychopaths legally accountable for their 
                                                          
5
 An additional and related problem for the law is how to deal with psychopaths who may not have 
committed crimes yet but are likely to do so. 
6 These justifications for punishment may either represent considerations that replace the notion of 
desert altogether or they may be conceived of as additional justifications for punishment that are 
constrained by the just deserts (Feinberg 1970; Fine and Kennett 2004; Pardo and Patterson 2013). 
7 The insanity defence is the primary vehicle for excusing individuals of responsibility who, due to their 
mental condition or disorder, have insufficient moral understanding or impaired rationality at the time 
their crimes were committed. If an individual is acquitted after a successful plea of insanity, the court 
typically automatically commits her to psychiatric treatment and surveillance. Psychopathy is currently 
not amongst those psychiatric disorders that are considered to be a necessary (though not sufficient) part 
of such a defence by the American Model Penal Code and most analogous codes in other countries. 
However, the evidence of psychopaths’ impaired moral cognition discussed in the last section may be 
seen to count in favour of changing this. 
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criminal conduct centre on the negative implications of not doing so. In other words, it 
is either unfair or undesirable to the rest of society—including, perhaps, other 
criminals—not to punish psychopaths. One salient consequence that we may deem 
undesirable is the threat posed by psychopaths. According to an extensive recent review 
of recidivism amongst psychopaths, individuals who scored high on the Hare 
Psychopathy Checklist—Revised were three times more likely to recidivate and four 
times more likely to violently recidivate than those who did not score high on the 
checklist (Hemphill et al. 1998). On balance, we might therefore think that it is in the 
interest of societal security and the future protection of citizens to sentence 
psychopaths to prison or at least find some alternative means of confinement. In fact 
this is precisely the type of consideration that might push one toward regarding 
psychopathy as an aggravating factor in the sentencing stage (Pillsbury 1992; Hart 
2009).  
 
Even those who are opposed to holding psychopaths fully legally responsible worry 
about the negative consequences to society of excusing psychopaths. Cordelia Fine and 
Jeanette Kennett suggest that some form of preventative detention can be justified on 
the ground of society’s right to protect itself against future crimes: “If a real threat 
persists to the serious interests of members of the community, then measures such as 
preventive detention may be justified by the right to self-defence” (2004, p. 438). Morse 
also discusses the possibility that psychopaths could be preventively detained due to 
their dangerousness (2008; 2011b). As he recognizes, however, allowing risk 
assessment of violent and sexual recidivism to play a role in sentencing and detention 
comes at a high price—even on consequentialist grounds. A rationale can also be raised 
against increasing punishment or preventative detainment when we consider the 
interests of individuals who are deprived of their freedom, some of whom might in fact 
not re-offend. In evaluating the prospects for introducing such a generalized condition 
for civil commitment of psychopaths, Morse thinks there will be a trade-off between 
infringements on individual rights and liberties and the risk for false positives (i.e., 
psychopaths who are contained but would in fact not re-offend), on the one hand, and 
the need to secure public safety on the other. He doubts that the current method of 
predicting re-offending is reliable enough for introducing such generalized policies 
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toward groups like psychopaths (2011b, p. 1124 f.). At the same time, he concedes that 
psychopathy is a valid risk variable in predicting future dangerousness (2010, p. 60).  
 
Morse and others also raise legitimate consequentialist concerns associated with the 
possibility of excusing psychopaths under the insanity defence (2011b). Fine and 
Kennett (2004) worry that admitting psychopaths under the insanity defence might 
impose more threats of harm and disruption to other patients/inmates and staff upon 
their admittance to psychiatric institutions.8 One alternative that Morse suggests is that 
the insanity defence could be specifically tailored to psychopaths. Psychopaths might 
first be acquitted on the basis of a successful insanity defence, but might then be 
committed to civil commitment that is subject to review. This would amount to an 
involuntary civil commitment within an extended form “disease jurisprudence”. But as 
Morse rightly acknowledges, even if civil commitment is in principle subject to review 
(unlike preventative detention), because of the lack of fully effective treatment of 
psychopaths, release for psychopaths is going to be very unlikely upon commitment. 
Besides, Morse argues, psychopaths will probably not plead insanity anyway, as they 
would then knowingly subject themselves to probably indefinite civil commitment, a 
practical consequence that would be much worse than punishment that has the 
possibility of parole (2010, p. 53f., 2011b, 1119f.; see also Edens et al. 2001). This 
alternative is thus unlikely to be used by psychopaths. It therefore seems that even in 
those cases where disease jurisprudence would in principle be applicable, it will not in 
practice be invoked. 
 
But even if the insanity defence were feasible in practice, there are further reasons for 
retaining psychopaths’ criminal responsibility. One expressivist reason is the 
                                                          
8 Another rather common but unpersuasive proposal about subsuming psychopaths under the insanity 
defence is that they cannot be as successfully rehabilitated or treated, as offenders with mental disorders 
where the insanity defence tends to be evoked, e.g., psychosis and schizophrenia (Reznek 1997; Lee 
2007). There are several problems with this proposal. First, it is not clear whether therapy and 
interventions are as futile as they are commonly thought to be. More importantly, the insanity defence is 
perceived as legitimate in other cases where there is no chance of rehabilitation, such as disabilities and 
dementia. In general, the possibility of and susceptibility to treatment do not constitute the grounds of 
defence.  
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maintenance of public trust and credibility in juridical institutions. If the juridical 
system can’t punish blatantly “bad” people like psychopaths, the public might very well 
worry about what legitimacy it has. If we want to secure trust and confidence in our 
courts, we must be able to hold psychopaths legally responsible for their offences; or so 
the reasoning goes (Levy, K. 2011). This worry can be understood in expressivist terms 
of the law’s role as a system of justice and of norm-affirmation, i.e., reinforcing society’s 
rules by showing what behaviour we collectively agree is unacceptable or immoral. 
However, it should be noted that this communicative understanding of punishment 
tends to presuppose at least some level of desert. It has been suggested that, for this it 
may be sufficient that psychopaths understand what the rules and the sanctions are, 
even if they are unable to relate to the moral reasons for refraining from certain actions, 
as some have suggested (Shoemaker 2011; Levy, K. 2011; Fox et al. 2013). Thus, unlike 
Morse, who thinks the same concept of desert must be fundamental both in the legal and 
moral setting, this approach recommends a minimal notion of (legal) responsibility 
where, at least for purposes of affirming and communicating norms, we would only 
require an understanding of those norms and some grasp of their rationales. One would 
then take punishment to be principally an expressive act which communicates the kinds 
of behaviour and actions which are impermissible. That the psychopath is able to 
categorize his action correctly and that it was an action is all that is required—the moral 
character of the psychopath is not the focus.9  
 
Although our point here is more to highlight the legitimacy of both expressivist and 
forward-looking considerations in the legal domain (and then to urge their applicability 
in the moral domain in the next section), we would like to comment more specifically on 
Morse’s suggestion that disease rather than desert jurisprudence might be more 
appropriate in at least some cases of psychopathy. We agree with Morse that it is only if 
an individual with psychopathy has been excused and a sufficient level of 
dangerousness has been established that we are allowed to practice disease 
jurisprudence. That is, these are the only cases when it may be justifiable to commit 
                                                          
9 The concern about upholding public confidence in legal institutions arguably also arises in a 
consequentialist analysis about the justice system’s role in giving individuals a sense of security and also 
in doing something that actually deters individuals with the threat of punishment or indeed involuntary 
commitment. 
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non-responsible people and thereby deny them their autonomy. It seems clear that this 
would apply to some psychopaths with extreme impulsivity and irrationality. On the 
other hand, as Morse also seems to recognize, we believe that most people with 
psychopathy do not seem to easily fit either disease or desert jurisprudence. As the 
discussion in the last section suggested, people with psychopathy tend to be in touch 
with reality and at least know how their actions are classified in the legal and moral 
systems—although it is doubtful whether they have a full grasp of moral right and 
wrong.  
 
On the assumption that this minimal level of moral understanding is present, we believe 
that norm-expression and prevention of future harm are sufficient grounds for keeping 
the majority of psychopaths on the side of desert jurisprudence. It should however be 
noted that our understanding of desert jurisprudence is clearly more impure than 
Morse’s, as it sees a larger role for consequentialist and norm-expressivist 
considerations once desert has been established. One point worth mentioning in this 
context is that if we allow consequentialist considerations into desert jurisprudence, the 
question arises whether containment beyond the length of the sentence is justified. We 
agree with Morse that it is inconsistent to tack involuntary civil commitment onto 
criminal punishment, the way this is done with sexual offenders in some places (cf. 
Morse 2011). We are, however, less opposed to letting reliable predictions of 
dangerousness influence the length of sentences, within limits. 10 
 
We hope to have shown that there are justifications for legal punishment of 
psychopaths or at least other legal measures that go beyond desert-based concerns 
alone. But once norm-expressivist and forward-looking considerations are legitimately 
introduced into the legal domain, we see no prima facie reason not to also consider 
them in the moral context. As we saw in the last sections, the discussion of moral 
responsibility of psychopaths has primarily been concerned with desert, but why 
should not analogous concerns, such as those about intervention and norm re-
affirmation also apply in the moral context? 
                                                          
10
 Where these limits should lie is beyond the scope of this article and is of course strongly dependent on the 
crime and the length of the sentence normally handed out for that type of crime. 
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5. Blaming Psychopaths Revisited 
As it stands, there is some evidence that at least some psychopaths do not satisfy desert 
constraints, though in section 2 we raised some worries about how conclusive this 
evidence is. However, in the last section, we saw that, at least in the legal context, there 
are compelling reasons for detaining psychopaths, but perhaps also for deeming 
psychopaths punishable, that do not rest on desert alone. It thus seems legitimate to ask 
whether analogous reasons hold in the moral domain of accountability. In this section, 
we will argue that there are. 
 
As we have shown, much of the resistance to holding psychopaths morally accountable 
is of the “there’s no point” variety; psychopaths are utterly insensitive or unresponsive 
to moral reasons and condemnation and we should not expect any change in either 
outlook or behaviour from them. The thought is also reinforced by the considerable 
“clinical pessimism” surrounding the treatability of individuals with psychopathic traits 
(Caldwell et al. 2007, p. 574). From a perspective concerned with desert, the question of 
prospective change and treatability of course appears orthogonal to that of 
responsibility. Whether someone can change in the future does not change whether he 
understood or was able to control his past actions. However, as we suggested in section 
3, holding psychopaths accountable for their actions might also be rejected on 
consequentialist grounds because it is perceived as pointless.11 The lack of treatability 
can thus be taken as a further consideration that shows why it is not worthwhile 
blaming or holding psychopaths accountable because there either are no good 
consequences or the consequences even make the “blamer” or the psychopath worse 
off. However, in this section, we will argue that to the extent that one is committed to a 
consequentialist analysis, the empirical results about interventions and prospective 
treatability matter. It also turns out that the empirical research on the possibility of 
achieving significant behavioural improvement through treatment is not as uniformly 
grim as is often claimed (Salekin et al. 2010). Since there seems to be some prospect of 
beneficial consequences, we think there are some consequentialist reasons for holding 
                                                          
11
 As we have argued, the objection from pointlessness can also be given an expressivist reading. We 
further discuss the expressivist rationale below. 
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psychopaths accountable. 
 
The strongest evidence for successful intervention is for children or adolescents with 
psychopathic traits. Evidence from developmental studies suggests that even if 
psychopathy arises early in development, the social and developmental setting 
contributes a great deal to the expression of the disorder. For example, harsh and 
inconsistent parenting is strongly associated with psychopathy (Frick et al. 2003; 
Pardini and Loeber 2007). It is therefore natural to expect that the contrasting parental 
strategy would reverse a detrimental impact on the children. Indeed there are positive 
signs from cognitive and behavioural programmes that involve family. Dynamic 
interventions that focus on teaching parents to use unequivocal and consistent signs of 
moral disapproval/approval over time have also been shown to yield some 
improvement in moral and social behaviour of children that scored high on Hare’s 
psychopathy checklist (McDonald et al. 2011). Conversely, such programmes suggest 
that exempting individuals from the responsibility and treating them as “lost causes” 
early in development might lead to worse behaviour and might even become a self-
fulfilling prophecy (Shaw 2003).12 
 
More generally, there is a lot of psychological evidence showing that the belief that one 
can affect outcomes through one’s efforts or free will is important both to the 
motivation to achieve instrumental results and to moral and pro-social behaviour (cf. 
Mueller and Dweck 1998; Baumeister et al. 2009; Vohs and Schooler 2008). As with 
healthy subjects, a precondition of demanding change from psychopaths is arguably 
that we communicate that such change is actually possible (and current behaviour is not 
immutably fixed by psychopathic traits). The importance of holding individuals 
responsible for their behaviour even in conditions where their self-control or decision-
making abilities are impaired has also been noted both in the context of addiction and 
that of psychopathology (Pickard 2011; Charland 2011). Interestingly, Kochanska and 
Aksan have suggested that having positive social relations, including the positive 
behavioural responses like compliments, trust and praise, might be particularly 
                                                          
12 On some accounts of moral responsibility it may be that the possibility of intervention is itself evidence 
for desert. We leave it to others to explore the plausibility of this line of argument. 
18 
 
important for psychopaths’ development in order to compensate for the morally 
detrimental behavioural effects of fearlessness and lack of inhibition (2006, p. 1604).  
 
Taken together, these points supports the importance of sanctioning immoral behaviour 
by word or deed in order to make clear what is and is not acceptable, that unacceptable 
behaviour has negative repercussions and that change is possible and expected.  
By doing so we might affect the psychopath’s social and moral behaviour over time, 
thereby achieving desirable results for the individual with psychopathy and for society 
at large.13 
 
Two related worries might be raised at this point. The more general worry is how much 
change can actually be expected from psychopaths. As we have seen, it is often asserted 
that, no matter what we do, psychopaths will not have a change of heart. A first 
response is that we need not achieve maximum effectiveness for moral engagement 
through blame to be worthwhile; even some improvements on the psychopath’s social 
and moral behaviour would be beneficial to society—and it seems for the psychopath 
themselves (see Ullrich et al. 2007). Moreover, the demand for deep change would ask 
too much from other disorders where there are social deficits, such as autism, but 
where we tend to (or at least arguably should) adapt our expectations to fit with the 
constraints of the disorder. 
 
But even if we concede that some minor, predominantly behavioural, changes are in and 
of themselves a worthwhile end, we might wonder why we need moral blame and 
praise in our interactions with psychopaths and whether these truly lead to an 
improvement in moral understanding and motivation. This worry arises because it is 
frequently supposed that to the extent that any behavioural improvement is possible it 
is psychopaths’ self-interest which is used as a lever for treatment and behaviour 
                                                          
13 In fact, one of the authors believes that the impact of the social responses and environment on the 
development of some psychopathic traits provides some grounds for arguing that there may also be a 
fairness dimension of our responsibility attributions. That is, the argument for holding psychopaths 
accountable is not only that we might we affect the psychopath’s social and moral behaviour over time 
with some hope for desirable results for the individual with psychopathy and for society at large, but also 
out of fairness continue to morally engage with individuals thereby acknowledging that their traits may 
be partly a failing on the part of the moral community as a whole. 
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modification, not any moral insight into the wrongness of their actions (cf. Wong and 
Hare 2005). When we resort to approaches which only aim at compliance with the 
rules, the thought is that we do not engage with psychopaths as moral agents, but rather 
take a harm reduction approach. It is worthwhile pointing out that in this respect our 
reactions to psychopaths are continuous with more normal cases of displaying approval 
and disapproval, which typically neither require deep moral insights nor distinctively 
moral condemnation. Furthermore, the question about whether the moral discourse of 
blaming and praising specifically is required for change in the case of psychopathy is 
largely empirical. We have seen that there is at least some evidence that various 
therapeutic and cognitive/behavioural programmes, whose interventions employ some 
means of conscience training and reciprocal moral engagement with others, achieve 
some improvement, albeit to a lesser extent than with normally developing individuals 
(Shaw 2003; Salekin et al. 2010; McDonald et al. 2011).14 
 
But of course blame and accountability do not only function as a forward-looking 
intervention. Most people believe that blame should fundamentally express a 
retrospective judgment about a wrongdoing. Morse takes this to be a central feature of 
blame: “Blaming fundamentally expresses retrospective disapproval and respect for 
persons. Even if it has the good consequence of decreasing future wrongdoing, our 
current focus of blame is undeniably focused in large measure on past events” (2011b, 
p. 1122). Thus, at least on one reading of Morse, the act of blaming also serves to 
express our judgment about what past actions we morally disapprove of and the fact 
that we take an agent seriously as a moral agent.   
 
Still, as in the legal context, for such norm-expressivist concerns to apply we might only 
require a minimal notion of desert, such that the agent has some understanding of those 
norms and some grasp of their rationale. It may even be possible that we can bracket 
the issue of responsibility if we target our disapproval primarily at the behaviour, 
rather than at the person who behaved in such a way.15 This would allow us to reaffirm 
                                                          
14
 It is of course entirely possible that these findings only hold for a subgroup of youthful psychopaths or 
for so-called “secondary” psychopaths (for this distinction, see Mealy 1995). 
15 We would like to thank Jeanette Kennett for alerting us to this important possibility. 
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our norms without explicitly committing ourselves concerning the agent’s 
blameworthiness.16 After all, it is typically not only the wrongdoer whom we address in 
our expressions of blame: when we blame psychopaths for transgressions, we are 
expressing and reaffirming moral norms and values to ourselves and our community. 
The norm-expressivist concern about blame is then linked to a broader concern about 
affirming our moral practices and norms. Even if the wrongdoer cares more about the 
actual social disapproval itself or the threats of negative repercussions involved in 
blaming than the rationales explaining why some action is blameworthy, this does not 
detract from our need to express, reaffirm and clarify why a certain kind of behaviour is 
morally unacceptable. The point is analogous to the one about the law’s role in 
sanctioning norms and encouraging public trust and confidence that we raised in the 
previous section. By holding individuals accountable, the law signals that we expect all 
members of the community to abide by certain principles and that it will act if we do 
not. Thus, to the extent that we are convinced by this argument in the case of the law, 
we believe that it should have equal if not stronger weight in the moral case.  
 
Finally, we would like to suggest a reason for holding people who exhibit psychopathic 
behaviour morally accountable that is more specific to the moral context. In many 
encounters with people with psychopathic traits who commit moral transgressions 
such as in schools, on the street, and in the workplace, there is typically very little 
evidence available about their conditions. At the very least, there is typically much less 
than there is in court, where one has access to psychiatric expertize, a record of past 
behaviour and offences, and perhaps even a diagnosis. Given the uncertainty of the 
exact condition of a putative psychopath, we should err on the side of accountability. In 
other words, we should err on the side of keeping putative psychopaths within our 
moral community by retaining behavioural demands and expectations and allowing for 
moral condemnation as well as forgiveness.  
                                                          
16 While it has to be admitted that this is a difficult feat to accomplish, Pickard (2011) recommends a 
similar course of action in the context of the interaction between health care providers and individuals 
with personality disorders. She stresses the importance of holding service users responsible for their 
behaviour while not rejecting them as individuals. It should however be pointed out that Pickard 
distinguishes between holding responsible and blaming in a way we do not. This is because she takes 
blame to be emotionally charged and to have a characteristic “sting” attached to it (cf. Pickard 2013). 
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This is also important as it is now widely accepted that psychopathy falls on a spectrum, 
where there is considerable heterogeneity amongst the group (Guay et al. 2007). This 
variability is especially clear in the context of children and adolescents, where the 
characteristic features of adult psychopaths can be identified, but appear to be 
distributed along a continuum (Murrie et al. 2007). At the same time, we have seen that 
it is amongst this group where interventions are likely to be the most successful. 
Although it is often helpful to know a person’s psychiatric background so that we can 
tailor our expectations and reactions to some extent, we are unlikely to know exactly 
how severe a case of psychopathy a person has and how much change is possible for 
that person. In lieu of such detailed information, it thus seems better to err on the side 
of accountability.17  
 
Conclusion 
Irrespective of whether psychopaths are truly blameworthy, the state must find a way 
of dealing with them and their transgressions. It needs to protect its citizens, provide 
incentives against committing crimes, and communicate its moral rules and their 
importance. We believe that—excepting those cases where psychopaths exhibit severe 
rationality deficits—these goals are best achieved by treating psychopaths as legally 
responsible for their actions. This has the added benefit of preventing a use of disease 
rationales, which Morse criticizes, i.e., to justify indefinite commitment when it really is 
an unacknowledged form of further punishment. Similarly, it is important to find a way 
to respond to immoral behaviour of psychopaths outside the legal context. Contrary to 
Morse’s assertion, we believe that in most cases, there is a point to blaming and 
punishing psychopaths. In fact, there are moral reasons for doing so that have to do 
                                                          
17 We thank our anonymous referee for pointing out that this conclusion only holds if we can be sure that 
blaming and holding responsible do not have negative repercussions. There is some evidence that blame 
in understood as an emotionally charged condemnation of the person is counterproductive (cf. Pickard 
2011). However, in this section we have cited evidence which at least shows some beneficial effects of 
holding psychopaths responsible in the sense of pointing out that behaviour was morally wrong and 
imposing negative repercussions for such behaviour (e.g., Shaw 2003; Caldwell et al. 2007; Salekin et al. 
2010; McDonald et al. 2011). As mentioned, there is a growing body of experimental work that shows the 
belief that one can change is also an important precondition to attempting such change (Mueller and 
Dweck 1998; Baumeister et al. 2009; Vohs and Schooler 2008; Charland 2011). Holding people 
responsible is one way of expressing one’s confidence that this can be done.  
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with possible intervention and improvement, the need to affirm moral norms, and 
perhaps not least, human fallibility and the need to not give up on people who are on 
the fringes of our moral community. Since we are not at the stage of agreement with 
respect to the issue of psychopaths’ moral desert, there is an even stronger case for 
allowing such consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations some weight in 
the discussion.  
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